Australia's principal container ports, located in its state capitals, are owned and operated by state authorities that largely return profits from port operations to state governments. Since they govern the volumes of trade in most merchandise, they command immense influence over the openness and flexibility of the national economy. In this study, we estimate the elasticities of substitution between services of ports in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. We also examine the pricing of port services to estimate the extent of their interaction, from which we derive conjectural variations parameters to assess the actual and potential levels of price collusion. The results confirm that there is considerable potential for destructive oligopoly behaviour and that pricing by the apparently isolated Port of Melbourne has been effectively controlled by price-cap regulation. The services of the ports of Sydney and Brisbane are comparatively substitutable, however. Although their regulation appears to be less restrictive, this substitutability appears to result in some level of competition, which aids in the control of pricing.
Introduction
Australia's principal container ports are located in its state capitals. They are owned and operated by state authorities that largely return profits from port operations to state governments. Since they govern the volumes of trade in most merchandise, they command immense influence over the openness and flexibility of the national economy.
The ports of the east coast are operated by the Port of Melbourne Corporation, the Sydney Ports Corporation and the Port of Brisbane Corporation. They are the largest players in the Australian container ports industry and together they hold market shares totalling approximately 80%
1 . Although these ports tend to serve different hinterlands, land transport networks are sufficiently extensive that their markets overlap. It might therefore be assumed that their pricing decisions affect their respective throughput volumes both through their influence over total trade flows and via substitution between ports.
In this study we use data on quantities exchanged in ports, prices charged for their services and final demand by state 2 to estimate pair-wise elasticities of substitution between the services of East Coast ports. We also derive conjectural variations parameters to measure the extent of price collusion between ports. These estimates are 1 According to data supplied by the Association of Australian Ports and Marine Authorities (AAPMA) the market shares in containerised trade in financial year 2004/2005, measured in both full and empty Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs), exchanged were: Port of Melbourne-36.9%, Sydney Ports-26.6%, Port of Brisbane-14.0%, Port of Fremantle-9.0%, Others-13.5%. 2 Final demand is a measured proxy for state GDP.
put into a wider modelling framework to back out estimates for overall demand elasticities for port services and, subsequently, draw conclusions about the ports' optimal pricing behaviour in the absence of regulation. Our main finding is that elasticities of substitution are quite small and hence that there is considerable scope for use of the monopoly power in the container ports industry.
Among the studies of oligopolistic markets based on the conjectural variations approach the benchmark is a paper by Iwata (1974) . He studied firm behaviour in the Japanese flat glass industry in the period from 1956 to 1965. Brander and Zhang (1990) applied the notion of conjectural variations to the set of duopoly airline routes in the United States while a similar approach was used by Bresnahan (1987) to study the American automobile industry in the 1950's. Another line of research in this area has been aimed at estimating the elasticities of substitution between imported and domestically produced goods (the so-called Armington elasticities). For Australia, these were estimated by Alaouze, Marsden and Zeitsch (1977) as part of the project financed by the Industries Assistance Commission. Welsch (2006) studied Armington elasticities for France during 1970-1997 and found that, while initially the level of substitutability between home production and imports was rising for most commodity groups, it consistently fell after the 1980s. The explanation offered for this was that, following trade liberalization in the 1970s, imports provided closer substitutes for home production. However, with the passage of time, free trade induced intra-industry specialization that led to home production having different structures and increased differentiation from imports so the level of substitutability started to decline.
Our approach is different from these previous studies primarily because it focuses on estimating the elasticity of substitution for varieties distinguished not by country of production but by firm. Also, our elasticities are part of a larger modelling framework, enabling us to draw conclusions about the pricing behaviour of the firms in the container port sector in Australia. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief introduction to the market structure of Australia's East Coast port sector, Section 3 presents a generic model of a price interacting oligopoly with firm specific differentiated products. Section 4 describes the data. Elasticities of substitution and conjectural variations parameters are estimated in Sections 5 and 6 respectively. These estimates are then used to draw inferences about mark-ups charged which are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
Australia's East Coast Ports

Price-Interacting Oligopolists
Consider an economy with i=1,N industries that are in turn made up of companies respectively. As we are concentrating here on the services sector it is assumed that all supply comes only from domestic producers -there can be no imports of port services. Consumers choose the quantity of each generic product i. Their objective, when choosing the bundle , is to maximize their utility, The first step is just the standard consumer problem with Cobb-Douglas utility.
This yields the familiar Marshallian demands for the generic goods:
where i α is the reference expenditure share of sector i. Solving for the second step leads to expenditure shares of companies within the sector:
This in turn allows the formulation of the demand function for the product variety j in sector i:
With this demand function in mind, we can proceed to find the elasticity of demand for the products of firm j in sector i. In order to do this, we first derive the expression for the demand response
( ) ( ) 
where ij µ is the conjectural variations parameter that reflects the expectation of firm j in industry i as to the reactions of other firms to a marginal increase in its price (
). Substituting (10) into (9) we have that:
From this (and substituting (8) for ) we can derive the expression for the elasticity of
As all producers are the unique suppliers of their product varieties, each of them finds it optimal to behave like a monopolist in its product market. Therefore prices charged by them should satisfy the Lerner condition: (12) to estimate the overall demand elasticity for the services of each port. Finally, we apply equation (13) to see the implications of our estimates for optimal pricing behaviour of ports authorities in the absence of regulation.
Data Description
The data for the number of containers in Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) 
Estimating Elasticities of Substitution
The first step is to estimate the elasticities of substitution between service varieties. As the ports are at different distances from one another and lie in different geographical regions it is very unlikely that the elasticity of substitution between them would be the same for all 3 ports under study. As a result, the following analysis provides an estimation of "pair-wise" elasticities of substitution for all combinations:
Brisbane-Sydney, Brisbane-Melbourne and Sydney-Melbourne.
Firstly, however, we need to use the theory developed in Section 3 to derive an equation that is readily estimated. By combining equations (8) and (6), and dropping subscript i (the ports sector) for convenience, we arrive at the expression:
where is total demand for the services of the ports sector, i.
Assume, first, that all demanded quantity is readily supplied by firms. Then, to account for the effects of changes in overall income and in trade policy we incorporate in the equation (state) GDPĈ 8 as well as the quotient of imports to national GDP as a measure of openness of the Australian economy. 9 With these incorporations, the share of the output of services by port j in the pair-wise sum of port services supplied is:
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between services of the two ports in question, j y is the GDP contribution of hinterland region j, is total GDP contribution of the two state hinterlands, Y is national GDP and M is national imports. After taking natural logarithms, this relationship collapses to the following:
which might be readily estimated as:
where provides an estimate for
Quantities in equation (17) 
Stationarity issues
According to Augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests, some of the series used in estimation of equation (17) were (1 
Regression results
On the presumption that the quotients in (17) One of the major reasons behind the continuous growth in Brisbane's market share in recent years has been Queensland's comparatively rapid economic growth. The regression results suggest that, keeping other things equal, a 1% expansion in the share of Queensland in Australia's overall output resulted in an average growth in market share of the Port of Brisbane by 3%. This local GDP effect in explaining containerised imports in the Brisbane-Sydney pair was also the only significant effect in regression (17) at the 5% confidence level. The fact that all coefficients relating to fees charged by ports proved to be insignificant indicates that the results should be interpreted with caution, though the comparative weakness of the substitution estimates might also be due to the limited number of observations.
Estimates for price collusion
Estimates for conjectural variations parameters, ij µ , can be obtained directly by studying the relationships between prices charged by the three ports under study ( Figure   2 ), recalling that: Since pricing by the port of Sydney is not regulated in the same manner, its prices appear to move independently.
Elasticity of Demand and Mark-Ups Charged
Now that estimates are available of both the elasticities of substitution and the conjectural variations parameters we can use equation (12) 
14 ADF tests for unit roots are presented in Appendix 4. As all price series appear to exhibit a downward trend a time trend was added to the test regression. The number of lags for the differenced dependent variable was chosen on the basis of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 15 The very same cointegration test procedure indicates strong cointegration between prices charged in Brisbane and Melbourne, however. This result means that, "econometrically", there is a long-run relationship between prices charged at Brisbane and Melbourne. It is certainly an interesting finding, especially given that the results from the previous section indicate that the markets of the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane do not overlap and there is no direct competition between them. However strange this finding might seem, it has a relatively easy explanation: starting from mid-1990s both ports of Brisbane and Melbourne were subject to price regulation (price-cap regulation for Melbourne and price monitoring in Brisbane) which pushed their prices down. To the present, prices charged in Sydney have not been regulated and therefore they do not exhibit any correlation to prices charged at other ports.
where the are shares, within the pairing, averaged throughout the sample period.
The average elasticities of demand follow as listed in Table 3 .
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In this case we assume that the only competitor of Brisbane in container services is Sydney which is also Melbourne's only competitor. Because Sydney has two competitors, Melbourne and Brisbane, the overall elasticity of demand it perceives could be larger than that indicated here. Given these elasticities, the Lerner formula (equation 13) can be used to derive optimal mark-up ratios. That for Brisbane turns out to be 9.6, while those for the other ports are outside the theoretical range of the model. 18 These results suggest that the market interactions between the three ports are weak and that each has considerable monopoly power.
Regulation clearly plays a key role in pricing by all three ports. The only departure from this to emerge is that the services of the ports of Brisbane and Sydney are the most substitutable and hence that measurable competition exists between them. This implies that, while the regulation of the Port of Melbourne needs to be very restrictive, substitutability between Brisbane and Sydney could allow less restrictive regulation of at least one of these ports.
To assess the power of the regulatory frameworks under which each port operates we have estimated the actual mark-up ratios charged by them. A difficulty with this is the separation of recurrent fixed costs, which may be comparatively high in the lower-volume ports. Comparisons between ports might therefore be less robust than those over time. Our best estimates of the mark-up ratios are listed in Table 4 the Sydney Ports Corporation were, on the other hand, continuously increasing. Among the large ports on the east coast Brisbane managed to maintain the highest level of mark-ups charged, though this could be explained by Brisbane's considerably smaller volume and therefore its (likely) higher recurrent fixed costs. Clearly, regulation of port service pricing plays a critical role in all three of these Eastern States.
Conclusion
Elasticities of substitution between the services of Australia's East Coast ports are estimated to be quite low -around -1 between services of ports of Brisbane and Sydney and around -0.1 between those of the ports of Sydney and Melbourne. The possible reasons for this are:
• large distances between ports which make it unprofitable to use services of another port even if differences in fees charged by ports are substantial • long-term arrangements that most of shipping lines sign with port authorities
• restrained competition among shipping lines which might prevent them from adjusting to differences in prices charged by ports • separation between the Southern and Eastern shipping routes, rendering port substitution costly • estimation difficulties that could bias the estimated elasticities downward.
The low elasticities of substitution imply that, even without price collusion by port authorities, varietal elasticities of demand are small and optimal oligopolistic markups over average variable cost are very large. The fact that actual mark-ups are well below these levels is a testament to regulation, particularly in the case of the port of Melbourne. The measurable substitutability between Brisbane and Sydney, combined with the weaker price regulation to which the port of Brisbane is subjected, may act to restrain mark-ups in those ports. Elasticity of substitution in the composite price taken to be -1.164. Elasticity of substitution in the composite price taken to be -0.777. Elasticity of substitution in the composite price taken to be -0.108. Elasticity of substitution in the composite price taken to be -0.111. 
